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Animals:�
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Oxford
Edited by D. G. M. Wood-Gush, M. Dawkins, and R. Ewbank.�
Ewbank.
Hertfordshire, England: The Universities Federation�
Federation
for Ahimal Welfare, 1981. 55 p. i5.GO.�
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This slender volume contains the
papers and (edited) discussions of a
July 1980 workshop.
Small print
makes possible the inclusion of more
content than the number of pages
would suggest.
The editors' intro
duction states that
[t] he aim [of the workshop]
was to bri ng together people
from a variety of disciplines to
discuss the problems of defin
ihg, describing and ihvestigat
ing the concept of 'self' in
animals, particularly farm ani
mals (3).
In doing this, the workshop was an
evident success. The editors also tell
us that the primary motivation in con
vening the workshop was the belief
that the experimental investigation of
the mental lives of nonhuman animals
"is a particularly important uhdertak
ing in the context. of animal welfare"
(ibid.).
Here the' wOI'kshop was less
fruitful;
little mention is made of
issues pertaining to the welfare of
honhuman animals.
The title of the
volume also occasions some disappoint
ment: farm animals are not the topic
of any of the papers, and only in the
second of two general discussions is
more than passing attention explicitly
given to them.
Nonetheless, the papers (and dis
cussions, which include comments from
the audience-largely of ethologists)
uhfailingly make for interesting read
ing.
Donald R. Griffin argues that
communication among nonhuman animals
can provide important evidence about
the mental states of such animals, and
he examines the ethological grounds
for attributing self-awareness to such

animals.
Stephen R. L. Clark ar
gues, in a somewhatWittgensteiniah
fashion, that attributions of mental
states make sense only in the context
of
behavioral
criteria
ahd
that,
accordingly, we are fully justified in
ascribing such states to nohhuman
animals.
D. M. Vowles and David
Bowsher report on interesting physio
logical research-Vowles on neurophar
macological . work that he believes may
point to "a rudimentary type of self
consciousness"
in
rats
(20),
and
Bowsher on recent studies of pain,
most of which follow up on the impor
tant Melzack-Wall "gate-control" theory
of pain (known to .many from Ronald
Melzack's
eminently
readable
The
Puzzle of Pain
[New York:
Basic
Books, 1973] and Melzack's and Pat
rick D. Wall's more recent The Chal
lenge of Pain
[New York:
Basic
Books, 1982]).
Guy Woodruff pres
ents intriguing results, obtained in
collaboration
with
David
Premack,
concerning chimpanzee communication
and its bearing on chimpanzees' sense
(Those interested in the
of self.
work of Griffin, Woodruff, and Pre
mack will want to consult their arti
cles, and the replies to them, in The
Behavioral and Brain Sciences I, 4
[December 1978].)
N. K. Humphrey
defends
the
intriguing
ethological
speculation that the expressive behav
ior of nonhuman animals is a reliable
indicator of conscious feelings not
because such behavior and feelings
are directly connected, but rather
because both are independently corre
lated with the needs of animals that
lead highly social lives and rely heav
ily on
intraspecies
communication.
Finally, Roger A. Mugford closes with
some ethological observations about
dogs.
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At several points, questions arise
in the papers that one wishes the
workshop participants had jointly pur
sued in discussion.
For example,
Humphrey's argument that expressive
behavior and mental states a rose as
distinct reactions to common evolution
ary pressures relies on his view that
the only adaptive value consciousness
has is to enable creatures to under
stand and communicate with other
members of their species. Clark, by
contrast, advances the more radical
view that conscious states have no
adaptive val ue in terms of evol ution
ary biology (14).
Clark also holds
that ascriptions
of mental
states
require a context of (possible) ex
pressive behavior, and that claim con
flicts with Humphrey's conclusion that
mental states and expressive behavior
are connected only by having both
resulted from the same causal factors.
It would have been useful if, in dis
cussion, Clark and Humphrey had
focused on the connection between the
adaptive value of consciousness and
the issue of how mental states and
expressive behavior a re related.
Is
Clark's belief, e.g., in the evolution
ary idleness of conscious states con
nected with hisWittgensteinian view
that we can ascribe mental states only
against a background of expressive
behavior?
In his admirable study, The Ques
tion of An/mal Awareness (New York:
Rockefeller University Press, 1976;
revised edition, 1981), Griffin has
argued that conscious mental states do
have adaptive val ue apart from expe
diting social communication (1976: 84;
1981: 144-5).
Indeed, there and in
the article cited above, he argues that
the
best
explanation
of
complex
behavior patterns of nonhuman animals
is often that those animals are in con
scious mental states. One wishes that
he had, in discussion, joined issue
with Clark and Humphrey.
The

participants

often

remark

on

the
importance
of
distinguishing
between awa reness and self-awa re
ness, and of being sensitive to the
spectrum of kinds of awareness that
can occu r.
But the question of
whether a particular' kind of creature
has self-awareness is usually dis
cussed as though self-awareness were
simply a special case of a creatu re' s
being aware of things-the special case
in which the creatu re itself is the
object of its awa reness.
So the evi
dent "lack of agreement [among the
participants]
over the meaning of
'self-awareness'"
(46) tends to be
treated as a disag reement about what
kind of object one must be aware of to
count as being aWare of one's self. It
is likely that self-awareness is a more
complex
notion than that sort of
approach suggests. To be self-aware,
one must to some degree be aware of
being in the mental states one is in,
and that kind of awareness deserves
independent,
detailed
discussion.
Being aware of being in one's mental
states is not merely a special case of
being aware of one sort or another.
If to be self-aware one must be
aware of being in at least some of the
mental states one is in, we must ask
what it is for a mental state to be a
conscious mental state.
For the men
tal states we count as conscIous are
just those we are aware of being in.
The workshop participants tend, how
ever, not to distinguish between 'con
scious' as it applies to mental states
and 'conscious' as it applies to crea
tures. The two notions are manifestly
distinct: it is natural to count as con
scious any animal that is awake and
sentient, whereas it is clea rly more
problematic what makes a mental state
a conscious mental state.
Failure to
distinguish the two uses of 'conscious'
can therefore lead to confusion about
when to deem that consciousness IS
present.
can

Failure to distinguish the two uses
also
make
some
claims
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unnecessarily difficult to evaluate.
For example, it would presumably be
easier to discern the source of Clark's
and H umphrey's doubts about the
adaptive val ue of consciousness if the
relevant passages in their papers dis
tinguishedin a clear way between an
organism's being conscious and 'its
being ,in conscious mental states~i. e.,
mental states of whkhitis conscious.
Moreover,
unless one distinguishes
between what it is for an organism to
be conscious and what it is for a
mental state to be conscious, one will
be led to talk, as the participants
often do, as thoiugh all mental states
are automatically conscious
states.
But that cannot be correct, since we
know that even humans are not always
conscious of thei rmenlal states.
These distinctions are important for
assessing the relevance of self-aware
ness to questions about the welfare of
nonhuman animals-a connection that is
perhaps more prohlematic than the
editors suggest in their introduction.
On the editors' view, self-awareness
is important for considering such eth
icalquestions because "it is almost
impossible to imagine how any creatu re
could su.ffer without being aware of
itself suffering" (3).
But the ability
to be aware of oneself being in a
mental state of whatever sort is a
highly sophisticated matter, far more
so than the mere ability to suffer.
. (For clinical. results that bear on the
complexities involved in such aware
ness, see Bowsher's paper, or Mel
tack, and Melzack and Wall, cited
above.)
Presumably it is suffering,
t'ather than any form of self-awa re
ness, that is primar'ily l'elevant to
issues about the welfare of nonhuman
animals,
We shOUld not let the difficulty of
imagining suffering without thereby
imagining awareness of the suffering
mislead us into thinking that such
awareness invariably accompanies gen
uine
suffering.
One
cannot,
in
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general, imagine a mental state with
out imagining that whatever creature
is in that mental state is aware of
being init.6'ut that is due not to
the natu reof mental states, but to
what itis to imagine something.
There is , moreover, ada'ng'er that
t'heidea that se'lf'-awareness automati
cally accompan ies mental states can
distort the way we thin kaboutethical
issues.
Many nonh uman animals 'evi
denty have r'easonably richa'nde:lab
orate mental Iives ,butsh6w little or
no clear sign that they are aware that·
they are in the mental states they are
in, a soppo sed to their simply being
in those menta!1 states.
But, if no
mental states can occu r without self
awareness, one may be tempted, to
doubt, or even-as Descartes did-to
deny, that such an'imals have any
mental states,
properly so called.
The dichotomy
between
self-aware
mentality and mer'e
biological
re
sponse, against Which Clark rightly
Wa rns us (16), will thereby he rein
forced.
The 'idea that mental states
are transparent to s'elf-'consciolfsness
will thus have a manifestly destructive
influence on the way We consid'er the
welfare of nonhuman animals.
Many species of nonhuman an ifna'ls
have elaborate and complex ways of
expressing their mental states.
But
we have how no clear evidence that
any nonhuman species has a means of
commu n ication, natu ral to that spec
ies, which enab'les its members to
describe, as well as express, thei'r
mental states. And it is unli kely that
any other' sod of evidence can help
us determine that a creature is actu
ally aware that it IS in a particUlar
mental state, as opposed to its simply
being in that state, without also being
aware that it is.
Thus, although it
may well be that many nonhuman ani
mals are aware of being in the mental
states they are in, it may also be
markedly difficult to come by clear-cut
evidence that they are.
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There
are
weil- known
studies,
which help expandoLJr grasp of hOh.
hOh.human mentality, in which great apes
hav!:! learned to use linguistic con
constructiohS dev.ised by hurnahs.
But
care is heeded t6 interpret what the
apes say, all the rnore SO since they
are learning an alien form of communi
communication.
HumariS often use mental idi
idioms to describe wholly nonmental mat
matters;· " . think it's raihihg' is typically
not about one's mental state, bUt
aboUt the weath1:lr. We woLild have to
be fairly confident that a creature has
a good command bf mental idioms
before tontlUdirig that it is telling us
about its mehtal states ~
BUt a creaturl:! clear-Iy tan have an
elaborate array of mental states with
without being cible to describe them.
AccbrdinsJly, it is rl:!elsonable to take
apparent expressions of mental states
at .• f~cevaiUe, as . reliably iridicating
tHepreseH~e of those states. . And. it
is reasonable to do so even when the·
creatLlt'e-whether nonhuman or hu
human-caHriot
describe
those
mental

states.
Moreover, we are evidently
justified in taking apparent expres
expressions of mental states at face value,
as the workshop participants generally
do, whatever the merits may be· of
special theories, such as Clark's and
Humphrey's,
about the
connection
between meritell states and expressive
behavior.
(Descartes seems to have
been clear about the need to distin
distinguish between describing and ex
expressing one's mental states.
For he
takes care to deny that tHe behavior
of nonhuman animals can even express
mental states, and not rnerely tHat
their' behavior cannot describe sLich
states. ) These considerations suggest
that it is wrong to stUdy corntnLJhica
corntnLJhication in nonhumari species on the model
of human language and, more geher
geherally, to .model nonhuman menti:llity dh
the human capacity for self-aware
self-awareness, as the workshop participants
tend to do.
For to do So opens the
way, howt:!ver unihteritidni3l1y; to an
otHerwise
Linwart'anted
skepticism
aboUt the ricHness of the ihi:!ntal lives
of nonhuman animals.
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